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Who Is a Qualified Beneficiary?
John P. Edgar*
The Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) definition of “qualified beneficiary”1 has caused confusion among trustees, especially the application of
the definition’s subsection (C). What constitutes the “trust”? When has
the trust “terminated,” and who are the distributees if it does? These
questions arise in many fact patterns, particularly in dynasty trusts. This
article considers the common questions as well as answers that have
been suggested by practitioners and the courts. This article also suggests
possibilities for reform.
The Comment provides in part,
The qualified beneficiaries consist of the beneficiaries currently eligible to receive a distribution from the trust together
with those who might be termed the first-line remaindermen.
These are the beneficiaries who would become eligible to receive distributions were the event triggering the termination of
a beneficiary’s interest or of the trust itself to occur on the date
in question. Such a terminating event will typically be the
death or deaths of the beneficiaries currently eligible to receive
the income.2
The Comment implies only two categories, lumping subsections (B)
and (C) together, and not providing much guidance for the interpretation of (C). Since the definition has three parts, not two, perhaps the
Comment should add a third category: “those who might be termed lastline remaindermen.” But is that the best rule?
Assume a trust says income to A for life, then income to B for life,
then principal to C. There is no provision for terminating the trust while
A or B is alive. Clearly, A is a qualified beneficiary under subsection
(A), and B is one under subsection (B). Whether C is one under subsec* Baltimore, Maryland.
1 “Qualified beneficiary” means a beneficiary who, on the date the beneficiary’s
qualification is determined: (A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income
or principal; (B) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or
principal if the interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on
that date without causing the trust to terminate; or (C) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 103(13) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
2 Id. § 103.
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tion (C) is more difficult. Who receives the principal if the trust terminates depends on the circumstances of termination.
When a trust terminates because of unanticipated circumstances or
inability to administer the trust effectively under UTC Section 412(c),3
or because it is uneconomic under UTC Section 414(c),4 its assets are
distributed in a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust. According to the Comments, this typically means to the qualified beneficiaries in proportion to the actuarial value of their interests. This is
circular: the qualified beneficiaries are those who receive something if
the trust terminates, and if the trust terminates it is distributed to the
qualified beneficiaries.
Or does the meaning of “if the trust terminated on that date” require us to assume the death of all beneficiaries for whom the assets will
be held in trust? In our hypothetical, the assets are held in trust only
during the lives of A and B, so when they die, the trust terminates, and
the distributee is C. But that conclusion requires adding multiple facts
(two deaths) to a test that is supposed to occur “on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined.” Also, the Comment says the terminating event will typically be the death or deaths of the beneficiaries
currently eligible to receive the income, not all beneficiaries. What if
there are serial income interests for A, B, C, D, and E before it passes to
F. Is a F a qualified beneficiary, but not C, D and E?
The application of subsection (C) is especially difficult in dynasty
trusts, where termination is remote (or never). Assume a trust that is
not subject to the rule against perpetuities permits distributions to all of
the settlor’s descendants. The trust ends only if they all die, in which
case it goes to contingent takers such as charity or collateral heirs. The
contingent takers are distributees if the trust terminates, but should they
be qualified beneficiaries? The UTC, which was written before such
trusts were commonly drafted, does not address this issue clearly. One
possible answer is no, on the grounds that if the trust terminated, the
distributees would be the then-living descendants. But the fact pattern
does not say that.
Mississippi says yes. In the process of enacting its version of the
UTC, including Section 103(13) without change,5 the Mississippi Secretary of State Trust Code Study Group, with the assistance of members of
the Uniform Law Commission, prepared several examples of the definition of “qualified beneficiary.” Example 4 is a dynasty trust for all of the
settlor’s descendants, with discretionary income and principal distributions until the end of the rule against perpetuities period, at which time
3
4
5

Id. § 412(c).
Id. § 414(c).
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 91-8-103(21) (2019); see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(13).
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the trust will be distributed to the settlor’s then-living descendants, per
stirpes. If the descendants die out before then, the assets go to a charity.
At the testing date, the settlor had seven descendants. The Example
states that the seven descendants are qualified beneficiaries under subsection (A). There are none under subsection (B), because if all the descendants died, the trust would terminate. Finally,
The charity is a qualified beneficiary of the trust from sub-paragraph C, because the trust will terminate upon the earlier of
the death of all of the descendants or the end of the rule
against perpetuities, and if the trust terminates upon the death
of all the descendants, the trust assets are distributed to the
charity. Unborn descendants are not qualified beneficiaries.6
Another possible interpretation is that the dynasty trust must divide
at some point into new trusts, in which case the prior trust has “terminated,” and thus you look only at the next level of distributees, who will
also be among A’s descendants. But the fact pattern does not say that
there will be a termination of the old trust. Can trust terminations be
assumed to occur at some point? If so, how is trust termination defined?
Other questions regarding subsection (C) arise in many trusts, not
just dynasty trusts. For example, does drafting matter? In Mississippi,
Example 5 provides the same facts as Example 4, except that the trust
agreement provides that if the descendants die out before the termination of the dynasty trust, the assets go to the settlor’s heirs-at-law, who
currently would be his spouse and children. This makes the spouse a
qualified beneficiary under subsection (C). By contrast, Example 6 provides the same facts as Example 5, except that if the descendants die out
before the termination of the trust, the assets go to the settlor’s spouse
and children pursuant to state law, and the spouse is therefore not a
qualified beneficiary. So drafting appears to matter.
Can a settlor cut off rights of successor beneficiaries by providing
that a trust terminates before passing to them? In Rachins v. Minassian,
the Florida court said no.7 The trust permitted distributions only to the
decedent’s wife during her life. After the wife’s death, the trust will “terminate” and any property remaining will be divided into a separate trust
share for each of the decedent’s children. The children filed a complaint
against the wife about her administration of the trust as trustee. The
wife argued that the children did not have standing because they were
not qualified beneficiaries because the trust would terminate at her
6 Examples for Mississippi Uniform Trust Code on Qualified Beneficiaries, MISS.
SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.ms.gov/Policy-Research/Documents/Examples%20for
%20Qualified%20Beneficiaries.pdf [hereinafter Mississippi Examples].
7 Rachins v. Minassian, 251 So. 3d 919, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
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death. The wife even appointed a trust protector to amend the trust to
clarify that any property remaining after the wife’s death would be distributed to a new trust to be created for the benefit of the children. The
children countered that the trust provisions did not create a new trust,
but instead created separate shares for them in the existing trust upon
the wife’s death. The Florida statute is similar to the UTC, except that
in paragraph (C) it adds “in accordance with its terms” after
“terminated.”8
The court held that the children were qualified beneficiaries under
subsection (C) because they would be distributees of trust principal if
the trust terminated in accordance with its terms.9 In a footnote, the
court added that even under the original trust, the children would be
qualified beneficiaries under subsection (B), since the trust would not
terminate when the wife dies.10 This was true “even though the Family
Trust terminates at the wife’s death and even though the children would
be distributees of any remaining trust principal in the Family Trust only
through a newly-created trust for their benefit,” and even though “the
husband may have intended to prevent the children from challenging
the manner in which the wife spent the money in the Family Trust during her lifetime.”11
By contrast, a Mississippi example treats the trustee of the new
trust, not its distributees, as the qualified beneficiary of the old trust.12
In Example 3, a decedent created a trust that permitted discretionary
distributions of income and principal to his spouse and two adult children for his spouse’s life, and then would be distributed outright to the
two children, but if a child was then deceased, his share would be held as
a separate trust. Example 3 stated that since under the provisions of the
will, the trust will terminate and pass to independent and separate subtrusts for the benefit of the grandchildren, the minor grandchildren will
not be qualified beneficiaries under subsection (B), and the new trustees
would be qualified beneficiaries under subsection (C).
Note, however, that Example 2 reached the opposite result as Example 3, on the same facts, except that if a child was deceased at the
spouse’s death, his share would “remain in trust” for the benefit of his
children. Example 2 stated that the grandchildren, not the trustee, are
qualified beneficiaries under subsection (B) because upon the death of
the qualified beneficiaries under paragraph (A), the trust does not terminate, and the grandchildren are permissible distributees. Again, draft8
9
10
11
12

FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(16)(c) (2019).
Rachins, 251 So. 3d at 925.
Id. at 925 n.3.
Id. at 925.
Mississippi Examples, supra note 6.
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ing appears to matter. Example 7 reaches the same result as Example 2
for similar reasons.
In a Kansas case, the successor beneficiary argued that the trust
would terminate at the death of the current beneficiary, and that subsection (C) applied, but was unsuccessful.13 The trust provided for distributions to Ms. Wills for life, then to her son, Mr. Kastner, for his life. Mr.
Kastner, the Plaintiff, sought removal of the trustee or modification of
the trust. Unfortunately for him, Kansas omits subsection (B) from its
definition of “qualified beneficiary.” Thus, unlike the children in
Rachins, Mr. Kastner was arguing that his mother’s trust would terminate at her death, which would make him a qualified beneficiary under
subsection (C). The court did not view the death of Ms. Wills, followed
by continuation of the trust for Mr. Kastner, as a termination of the
trust. The court noted that Mr. Kastner is entitled to distributions only
after the death of his mother. “As such, Plaintiff is not currently entitled
to any distribution and would not currently be eligible for a distribution
if the trust terminated on this date.”14 The court added, “Plaintiff contends that he would be entitled to distributions if the trust terminated
with the death of Ms. Wills. However, the trust would not terminate on
the death of Ms. Wills, but rather, it would continue on for Plaintiff’s
benefit.”15
In determining when a trust terminates, when are there separate
trusts, and when is there a single trust? In Hadassah v. Melcer,16 the
court used both the plural “trusts” and the singular “trust,” as well as
the ambiguous “trust(s).” In the first paragraph of the opinion, the court
stated “Three sisters, the current distributees of an irrevocable trust
. . . .”17 Paragraph two stated that “The trust” was created by their
mother, for the benefit of their father, and at his death the balance “was
to be divided into three separate trusts for the benefit of their daughters.”18 The third paragraph referred twice to “their respective trusts.”19
Finally, paragraph four mentioned that “upon the death of each daughter, her trust terminates and the balance of the principal and any undistributed income is redistributed to the trust(s) of the remaining living
daughter(s). When the last daughter dies, the trust terminates” and
passes to three charities.20 The issue was whether the trustee was re13 Kastner v. Intrust Bank, No. 10–1012–EFM, 2011 WL 2149432, at *2, *3 n.22 (D.
Kan. June 1, 2011), aff’d, 569 F. Appx. 593 (10th Cir. 2014).
14 Id. at *3.
15 Id. at *3 n.22.
16 Hadassah v. Melcer, 268 So. 3d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
17 Id. at 760.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 760-61.
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quired to account to one of the charities. Technically, the case was decided under Florida Statute section 736.0110(1), regarding whether a
charity has the rights of a qualified beneficiary, but the definition is essentially the same.
The lower court found that
Each daughter is the sole distributee or permissible distributee
of her separate Trust. Upon the termination of each daughter’s
separate trust, the only distributee or permissible distributee of
trust income or principal would be the “Trusts created herein
for Grantor’s surviving daughters, in equal shares, or to the
Trust of the sole surviving daughter, as the case may be.”21
The appellate court, however, found an error in this “sequential termination of the daughters’ individual interests such that A’s interest passes
to B and C; then B’s interest passes to C; then C’s interest passes to the
charities. This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute.”22 It treated all three trusts as a single trust, writing,
The statute contemplates the simultaneous termination of the
interests of the distributees (“termination of the interests of
other distributees or permissible distributees then receiving or
eligible to receive distributions”). If the interests of the distributees of the trust were simultaneously terminated, all of the
daughters’ interests would terminate and the charities would
be the distributees. Therefore, the charities are qualified beneficiaries under the plain language of the statute.23
The common thread of these questions is what constitutes the trust
in applying subsection (C), when it terminates, and who are the distributees if it does. This raises the final question: should the definition include subsection (C), if subsection (B) applies? As noted above, the
Comment implies only two categories. Interestingly, several states (Kansas,24 Massachusetts25 and Utah26) eliminated subsection (B) in enacting
the definition. No state eliminated subsection (C). However, several
(Maine,27 North Dakota,28 Oregon,29 Tennessee30 and Wyoming31)
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 761.
Id.
Id. at 761-62 (emphasis in original).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-103 (2019).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203E, § 103 (2019).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-103 (LexisNexis 2019).
ME. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 103 (2019).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-03 (2019).
OR. REV. STAT. § 130.010 (2018).
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 35-15-103 (2019).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-103 (2019).
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modified the definition to limit the number of remote contingent beneficiaries who otherwise would meet the definition of “qualified
beneficiary.”
An alternative approach would be to change the definition to
match the existing Comment. For example, eliminate subsection (C), as
well as the phrase “without causing the trust to terminate” from subsection (B). Or provide that subsection (C) applies only if there is no beneficiary described in subsection (B).
The Uniform Laws Commission is planning to review the Uniform
Trust Code, beginning this year, so it will have an opportunity to clarify
the definition of “qualified beneficiary” to answer these questions.

